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open to abuse to be a defective theory; if 
anything, because of that potential it is 
a realistic one� I highly recommend this 
work as a useful resource for practical 
moral formation in just war theory�
ALI GHAFFARI
Rockets and People, by Boris Chertok, ed� Asif 
Siddiqi� Vol� 3, Hot Days of the Cold War. Wash-
ington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, History Office, 2010� 796 pages� 
$65�
In this third volume of his memoirs, ably 
edited by acclaimed space historian Asif 
Siddiqi, Boris Yevseyevich Chertok, who 
was the most senior surviving Soviet 
space engineer until his death at age 
ninety-nine in 2011, offers a unique, 
firsthand window into Cold War history 
as he lived it over his six-decade career� 
He spent most of it at the uppermost 
level of the OKB-1 design bureau (now 
S� P� Korolev Rocket and Space Corpora-
tion Energia), where he participated 
in every major project though 1991�
In this series, volume 1 details Chertok’s 
rise from aviation factory electrician 
to official in charge of extracting 
Nazi rocket expertise, volume 2 the 
post-1946 emergence of the Soviet 
missile program� In volume 3, Chertok 
recounts and reflects on the golden 
age of Soviet cosmonautics, from Yury 
Gagarin’s historic orbital flight in 1961 
to the death of key figures in the Soviet 
space program in and around 1967� 
Volume 4, released in early 2012, covers 
the U�S�-Soviet moon race� Chertok’s 
personable, technically informed, 
and somewhat politically detached 
perspective, as well as his frankness 
regarding credibility of sources and 
where he lacks information, makes for 
an accessible, historically useful account�
From his perch in the Soviet missile 
bureaucracy, Chertok observed the Cold 
War as a scientific-technological- 
military competition� Manned space-
flight was regarded as an indicator 
of national prestige—and socialist 
superiority: “There was an ongoing 
battle at the front line of the Cold War’s 
scientific-technical front� Rather than 
soldiers, it was scientists, engineers, the 
‘generals’ of industry, and workers who 
determined the battle’s outcome� And 
warriors of another sort came on the 
scene—cosmonauts” (p� 61)� Each side 
fed off the other in constant one-
upmanship, Chertok stresses: “American 
operations had a very strong effect on 
our plans� American historians of aero-
nautics assert that our successes were the 
primary reason why the United States 
converted its space programs into a top-
priority, nationwide challenge” (p� 246)�
Central to this competition, for some 
time, was a race to land a man on the 
moon� On August 3, 1964, Central 
Committee and USSR Council of 
Ministers Resolution 655-268, “On 
Work for Lunar and Space Research,” 
recommitted Moscow to “land a man 
on the moon and return him to Earth 
by 1967–68” (p� 397)� This goal was 
restated in a similar decree of October 
25, 1965 (p� 568)� This competition was 
very real, and there was no substitute: 
“[N]o matter how successful [other] 
programs might be, they could not 
compensate for our loss of superiority 
if the Americans were to become the 
first to fly around the moon” (p� 523)�
Then, despite suffering a major setback 
in the Apollo 1 fire of 1967, the United 
States started pulling ahead� The Soviet 
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program was held back by a year of 
time-consuming yet inadequate ground 
testing and the tragic death of Vladimir 
Komarov when Soyuz 1 crashed in 1967�
In retrospect, there were larger reasons 
for these results� The Soviet defense 
industry that Chertok depicts suffered 
from both direct involvement by party 
organizations throughout the produc-
tion process and limited government 
capacity, ruinous bureaucratic and 
interpersonal struggles and finger-
pointing, overly ambitious deadlines, 
lack of systematic review of decisions, 
and lack of politicians who understood 
the benefits of a comprehensive military-
civilian approach� So much depended 
on a single individual� Chief Designer 
Sergey Korolyov was a microcosm of 
Soviet society, having both suffered 
significant repression and marshaled 
significant technical resources� His 
untimely death in 1966, itself partly a 
result of medical malpractice, devastated 
the Soviet space program� Korolyov’s 
successor Vasily Mishin would prove 
far less effective at cultivating the 
Kremlin bureaucracy� Obsessive 
secrecy reigned� The Central Committee 
maintained a categorical prohibition 
on acknowledging space failures, even 
when detected by foreigners� Inefficient 
use of limited resources imposed 
additional burdens: “For a long time 
during the post-Khrushchev period, 
we continued to develop and produce 
several parallel lines of strategic missiles, 
allowing unjustified redundancy” (p� 
155), their overproduction camouflaged 
by creative budgeting (p� 146)�
The United States led significantly in 
missile numbers, accuracy, and nuclear 
weapons—a tremendous disparity dur-
ing the Cuban missile crisis, although 
subsequently the Soviets worked to 
reduce the gap� Spaceflights served 
propaganda purposes, in part to 
cover up missile limitations� Risky space 
spectaculars were attempted, including 
—on Khrushchev’s personal orders via 
telephone to Korolyov—the 1964 cram-
ming of three cosmonauts without space 
suits and with only limited life support 
into a Voskhod capsule whose “new 
landing system had only been tested 
once” (p� 237)� Soviet mission-control 
facilities were less advanced: “[T]he 
mission control centers at Cape Canav-
eral and Houston seemed like a fantasy 
to us” (p� 599)� The USSR fell behind 
in integrated circuits, microchips, and 
computers, in part because of a lack of 
civilian applications� Quantity reflected 
lack of technological integration:  
“[T]he first Soyuzes had so much varied 
radio technology on board that they 
required twenty antennas” (p� 580)�
Looking to the present and beyond, 
Chertok condemns the present Russian 
government’s “crime” of dismantling 
the nation’s great technological 
infrastructure (p� 331)� He makes 
fascinating future projections: by 2015, 
“China (and perhaps India) will become 
superpowers, surpassing Russia in terms 
of military-strategic might�” Future 
conflict may center on resource access; 
the United States, Europe, and China 
may covet Russia’s unparalleled reserves 
of oil and gas, China its fresh water and 
eastern territory as well� “Under those 
conditions, it appears that the strategic 
significance of high-precision, nonnu-
clear weaponry together with intermedi-
ate and even short-range tactical nuclear 
weapons might become a factor in 
deterring a large war just as ICBMs were 
in the 20th century” (pp� 156–57)� Cher-
tok judges further that “Chinese rocket 
and space technology will overtake the 
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Russian space program in ten to twelve 
years; and perhaps it will overtake the 
American program as well” (p� 585)�
As in previous volumes in the series,  
Chertok documents the toils of Soviet  
designers, who were remunerated 
poorly, subjected to difficult working 
conditions, and hidden from foreign 
sight and contact� Chertok learned of his 
nation’s deployment of missiles to Cuba, 
for instance, from Kennedy’s speech (p� 
95)! Driven in part by heartfelt ideals 
tempered by knowledge of the horrors of 
the Stalin era, these designers achieved 
so much, so quickly, under such 
formidable constraints—truly amazing 
accomplishments� Theirs is not only a 
Soviet legacy, rooted now in a bygone 
era, but a part of a larger human legacy 
that will inspire further exploration as 
mankind moves farther into space�
ANDREW S� ERICKSON
America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Mili-
tary History, by Andrew J� Bacevich� New York: 
Random House, 2016� 453 pages� $30�
The most recent book by Andrew 
Bacevich—a retired U�S� Army colonel 
and now-retired professor of history  
and international relations at Boston  
University—details the history of 
the four-decade U�S� involvement in 
“the Greater Middle East,” a region 
Bacevich defines as encompassing 
areas of the Persian Gulf, North 
Africa, and the Balkans�
The book starts with the formulation of 
the Carter Doctrine: how the OPEC oil 
embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and 
the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghani-
stan, combined with America’s need for 
oil and the fact that most of the world’s 
oil at the time came from this area, led 
then-president Jimmy Carter to declare 
the security and stability of this region 
to be a vital national interest� Bacevich 
believes the doctrine created a broad, 
open-ended commitment that expanded 
with time� Early in the book he describes 
the decision making, strategy and 
policy development, and organizational 
changes that positioned the United 
States as the guarantor of regional 
security� This was the context for the 
formation of U�S� Central Command, 
which included in its geographic area of 
responsibility not only the Persian Gulf 
states but a total of nineteen countries, 
including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Kenya, and Pakistan� Bacevich argues 
that this new combatant command 
created both an expectation of and the 
pretext for future military intervention 
in the Central Command region� The 
“Soviet threat of the 1980s served as a 
placeholder, providing a handy rationale 
for developing capabilities subsequently 
put to other purposes”; that “posture jus-
tified by the need to defend the Persian 
Gulf from outside intrusion positioned 
the United States itself to intrude�”
Bacevich offers a broad overview of 
significant events in this area of the 
world over the last thirty-five years� In 
addition to the Soviet invasion and oc-
cupation of Afghanistan and America’s 
support of the mujahideen “freedom 
fighters,” Bacevich discusses the Marine 
Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon, 
the U�S� attack against Mu‘ammar 
Gadhafi in Libya, and the war between 
Iraq and Iran� His broad synthesis 
similarly includes Somalia, Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the 
ensuing Gulf War, the conflict in the 
Balkans, and, of course, the attacks of 
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